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Abstract. Background: Agile techniques recently have received atten-
tion from the developers of safety-critical systems. However, a lack of em-
pirical knowledge of performing safety assurance techniques, especially
safety analysis in a real agile project hampers further steps. Aims: In
this article, we aim at (1) understanding and optimizing the S-Scrum
development process, a Scrum extension with the integration of a sys-
tems theory based safety analysis technique, STPA (System-Theoretic
Process Analysis), for safety-critical systems; (2) validating the Opti-
mized S-Scrum development process further. Method: We conducted a
two-stage exploratory case study in a student project at the University of
Stuttgart, Germany. Results: The results in stage 1 showed that S-Scrum
helps to ensure safety of each release but is less agile than the normal
Scrum. We explored six challenges on: priority management; communica-
tion; time pressure on determining safety requirements; safety planning;
time to perform upfront planning; and safety requirements’ acceptance
criteria. During stage 2, the safety and agility have been improved after
the optimizations, including an internal and an external safety expert;
pre-planning meeting; regular safety meeting; an agile safety plan; and
improved safety epics and safety stories. We have also gained valuable
suggestions from industry, but the generalization problem due to the
specific context is still unsolved.
Keywords: Agile software development, safety-critical systems, case
study
1 Introduction
To reduce the risks and costs for reworking and rescheduling, agile techniques
have aroused attention for the development of safety-critical systems. Tradi-
tionally standardised safety assurance, such as IEC 61508 [1], is based on the
V-model. Even though there is no prohibition to adapt standards for lightweight
development processes with iterations, some limitations cannot be avoided dur-
ing the adaptation [2]. Existing research in agile techniques for safety-critical
systems is striving for consistency to standards. Safe Scrum [3] is a considerable
success due to a comprehensive combination between Scrum and IEC 61508.
However, an integrated safety analysis to face the changing architectures inside
each sprint still needs to be enhanced. Therefore, in 2016, we proposed S-Scrum
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to integrate a systems theory based safety analysis technique, STPA (System-
Theoretic Process Analysis) [7], which was proposed by Leveson in 2012, inside
each sprint to guide a safe design [16].
Problem statement. We proposed to integrate STPA in a Scrum development
process to enhance the safety in agile development. However, it has not been
validated in practice. As far as we know, there exists no empirical data on ap-
plying Scrum for a safety-critical project with the integration of STPA.
Research objective and research questions. In this article, we aim to explore the
agility and safety of S-Scrum as well as challenges and their relevant optimiza-
tions for developing a safety-critical system called “Smart Home”. The research
questions are as follows:
RQ 1 How does S-Scrum handle agility and safety in safety-critical systems?
RQ 2 What are the challenges of S-Scrum in such a context?
RQ 3 How could S-Scrum be optimized to overcome the challenges?
RQ 4 What are the effects of the optimized S-Scrum on safety and agility?
Contribution. This paper provides the first case study on applying a Scrum
development process for safety-critical systems. We investigated the effects and
challenges of S-Scrum in the 1st stage of the case study. We proposed an opti-
mized S-Scrum and validated it in the 2nd stage of the case study. To this end,
we preliminarily discussed the optimized S-Scrum in industry.
Outline. The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the related work on
using Scrum for safety-critical systems and normal Scrum development process
improvement (Sect. 2). Then, we present the background about STPA and our
previous work about S-Scrum (Sect. 3). After that, we describe the approach
and results of the 1st stage of the case study (Sect. 4.1), and the 2nd stage of
the case study (Sect. 4.2). Finally, we discuss the threats to validity (Sect. 5),
and draw the conclusions (Sect. 6).
2 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, few empirical studies of applying Scrum or other
agile processes for safety-critical systems exist. Most of the research is still in
the stage of theoretical illustration and validation [8] [9].
Safe Scrum is a Scrum development process for safety-critical systems, which
was developed to adhere to the general functional safety standard IEC 61508
[3] [6]. Previous research of Safe Scrum has been synergized with other safety
standards in different domains [4] [5]. However, purely theoretical validation
is unable to cover the details of the process. More practical experiences are
becoming crucial.
Despite the limited practical experiences in applying Scrum for safety-critical
systems, there are a lot of Scrum development process experiences that could be
taken as a reference for the agile software process improvement of our project [25]
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[26]. Diebold et al. [10] investigated the industrial usage of Scrum with various
sprint length, events, team size, requirements engineering, roles, effort estima-
tions and quality assurance. Cho [11] conducted an in-depth case study in two
organizations. The data was analyzed along 4 dimensions, including human re-
source management; structured development process; environment; information
systems and technology. These factors were covered in our assessment of agility
considering our criteria to improve the S-Scrum.
3 STPA and S-Scrum
STPA is a new hazard analysis technique by Leveson in 2012. It has been suc-
cessfully used in various domains, such as aviation, automobiles and healthcare.
Compared with the traditional safety analysis techniques, such as FMEA (Fail-
ure Mode and Effects Analysis) and FTA (Fault tree analysis), STPA bases on
the systems theory rather than the traditional reliability theory. Due to an in-
creasing complexity of systems, the accidents are not caused by single function
failures or chains of failure events, but resulted from inadequate control actions.
To ensure the safety of today’s complex systems, the use of STPA is becoming
necessary. Besides, we proposed using STPA in a Scrum development process
[16], as current safety analysis techniques start from a complete design, which
is not consistent to agile methodologies, which advocate a lightweight up-front
planning and design. STPA, on the contrary, provides the necessary information
to start from a high-level architecture and to guide the incremental design pro-
cess. In S-Scrum, we integrate STPA mainly in three aspects: (1) During each
sprint, we integrate STPA as safety-guided design. (2) At the end of each sprint,
we use STPA on the product instead of a Reliability, Availibility, Maintainability
and Safety (RAMS) validation. (3) We replace the final RAMS validation with
STPA. The other parts are kept consistent to Safe Scrum: (1) The environment
description and the SSRS phases 1-4 (concept, overall scope definitions, hazard
and risk analysis and overall safety requirements). (2) Test Driven Development.
(3) Safety product backlog. (4) A safety expert [33]. We aim to fill the gap of a
lack of safety analysis in agile development and enhance the safety on the basis
of a standard-based Scrum development process for safety-critical systems.
4 Case Study
To explore S-Scrum further, we conduct this study following the guideline by
Runeson [17] and Yin [18]. We design this case study with a multi-staged pro-
cedure. Each stage has different objectives and research questions. We explored
the challenges and optimizations in S-Scrum in stage 1, while we validated the
optimized S-Scrum in stage 2.
4.1 Research Context
The case study (including stage 1 and stage 2) was performed in the project de-
veloping safety-critical systems, Smart Home, between March, 2016 and March,
2017 at the Institute of Software Technology, University of Stuttgart. The project
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had 400 planned working hours per head with a headcount of 14 students. The
students have taken part in a training program for agile development and STPA
before joining the project and a course on automation systems during the project.
The Scrum Master was one research assistant with experienced project manage-
ment background, while the Product Owner and Safety Expert was another
research assistant majoring in using agile for safety-critical systems. All the stu-
dents were supervised by three research assistants. The project was to work on
an IoT based smart home with a smart coffee machine, smart light alarm sys-
tem, autonomous parking system, door-open system, and smoke detector alarm
system through the IoT server - KAA1. The project “Smart Home” is openly
available in GitHub2.
4.2 Case study - stage 1
The objective of stage 1 is to validate the safety and agility of S-Scrum and
optimize it. In stage 1, we focus on answering RQ 1, RQ 2, and RQ 3. The
general research strategy in stage 1 is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Research strategy in stage 1 (“DL”-Developer, “SH”-Stakeholder, “SM”-
Scrum Master)
Time Sprint 1 to sprint 5 Sprint 6 to sprint 7 Sprint 8 Sprint 9
Process Scrum S-Scrum S-Scrum S-Scrum
Data
collection
Participant observation
Scrum artifacts
Documentation review
Participant observation
Scrum artifacts
Documentation review
Questionnaires
Semi-structured
interviews
Participants
DLs
SHs
DLs
SHs
13 voluntary DLs
5 voluntary DLs
1 SM
Data
types
Quantitative Quantitative Quantitative Qualitative
Analysis Sum of the numbers Sum of the numbers
Median
MAD
Coding
Output No safety data
Safety data:
M16.1-M16.3
M17.1-M17.3
Agility data:
M1-M15
Challenges
and
optimizations
of S-Scrum
Data collection in stage 1 Stage 1 spans from sprint 1 to sprint 9. Each
sprint lasts three weeks. The agility-related quantitative data, M1 to M15, were
collected through 13 questionnaires3. Our participant observation as the Product
Owner (the first author), the Scrum Master, and the customer imposed also an
evaluation and review of the results. The safety-related data, M16.1 to M16.3
and M17.1 to M17.3, were quantitatively collected during sprint 6 and sprint 7.
From sprint 1 to sprint 5, we executed normal Scrum without safety analysis for
the adaptation and preparation for the project. The STPA was performed by
1 https://www.kaaproject.org/overview/
2 https://github.com/ywISTE/student-project—Smart-Home
3 The questionnaire is available: https://zenodo.org/record/439696#.WODCovl96Uk
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the safety expert and recorded privately by using the STPA tool, XSTAMPP4,
while the hazards and safety requirements were recorded in the safety product
backlog in Jira.
Based on the quantitative data for agility and safety, we then designed semi-
structured interviews with 6 voluntary participants from the development team,
including the Scrum Master and five developers. The interviews lasted 270 min-
utes overall. The questions began with a specific set of questions regarding the
observations. Further, we asked about the causalities. Finally, the optimizations
were collected in an open-ended mode. The interview guideline5 was provided
before each interview. We recorded interview data in field notes and we used the
audio recordings for text transcription.
Data analysis in stage 1 We analyzed the data using the combination of GSN
[14] and GQM [15] referring partially to the VMF framework [13], as shown in
Fig. 1. The data are from two aspects: agility (S1) and safety (S2). To evaluate
and optimize agility (S1), we set 15 goals (G1 to G15) considering Compar-
ative Agility Survey [12]. They are: G1 (Team work composition); G2 (Team
work management); G3 (Communication); G4 (Requirement emergency); G5
(Technical design); G6 (Planning levels); G7 (Critical variables); G8 (Progress
tracking); G9 (Sources of dates and estimates); G10 (When do we plan); G11
(Customer acceptance test); G12 (Timing); G13 (Quality focus); G14 (Reflec-
tion); G15 (Outcome measure). To reach G1 to G15, we analyzed M1 to M15
indirectly by setting sub-metrics. For example, M1 (Team work composition)
was analyzed by M1.1 (Team members are kept as long as possible), M1.2 (Spe-
cialists are willing to work outside their specialty to achieve team goals), M1.3
(Everyone required to go from requirements to finished system is on the team),
and M1.4 (People are no more than two teams). Each sub-metric was analyzed
on an ordinal scale of 5 (e.g., from 1 to 5 means “Negative”, “More negative
than positive”, “Neither negative nor positive”, “More positive than negative”,
and “Positive”). To investigate the in-depth challenges, we found out either the
negative values of the results or the significant differences between the normal
Scrum and S-Scrum to formulate further interview questions. To analyze the
interview results, we used NVivo11 for text encoding [19]. Concerning safety,
G16 is extended with 3 questions together with 3 metrics including: number of
software hazards (M16.1), number of software safety requirements (M16.2), and
number of safety requirements traceable to hazards (M16.3). G17 is extended to
be evaluated by the number of mitigated hazards (M17.1), number of accepted
safety requirements (M17.2) in the present sprint, and number of rejected safety
requirements (M17.3) in the project.
Results in stage 1 - RQ 1: How does S-Scrum handle agility and safety
in safety-critical systems? We investigate the effect on agility by compar-
ing the normal Scrum and the S-Scrum according to the 15 metrics in Fig. 2.
From the general overview, we can conclude that most of the values regarding
4 http://www.xstampp.de/
5 The interview guideline is available: https://zenodo.org/record/439696#.WODCovl96Uk
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Fig. 1. General data analysis strategy (“FG”-Final Goal, “S”-Strategy, “G”-Goal, “C”-
Context, “Q”-Question, “M”-Metric )
agility in S-Scrum are slightly worse than those in the normal Scrum, while one
metric shows strongly negative values (“when do we plan”). We discussed the
results with the technical support from the Comparative Agility Survey and got
the feedback: when most of the values are more positive than negative (more
than “3”), we could say that the process is agile enough. Moreover, most values
show relatively small differences between normal Scrum and S-Scrum. Thus, we
consider the agility of S-Scrum to be acceptable. Yet, optimizations are needed.
Regarding the safety of S-Scrum, we performed STPA two rounds in sprint 6. We
found 6 software hazards (M16.1) and 15 safety requirements (M16.2), which can
all be traced back to software hazards (M16.3). Three hazards were mitigated
(M17.1), while 14 safety requirements were accepted (M17.2). In sprint 7, we
performed two rounds of STPA analysis. We found 10 software hazards (M16.1)
and 24 safety requirements (M16.2), which can also all be traced back to software
hazards (M16.3). Six hazards were mitigated (M17.1), while 23 safety require-
ments were accepted (M17.2). Each sprint has 1 rejected safety requirement due
to hardware limitation (M17.3).
Results in stage 1 - RQ 2 & RQ 3: What are the challenges of S-Scrum
in such context? & How could S-Scrum be optimized to overcome the
challenges? To optimize S-Scrum, we derived six challenges from the six ab-
normal values (see data analysis in stage 1) from the sub-metrics inside these 15
metrics.
Challenge 1: The priority management of safety requirements and functional
requirements has conflict. In the normal Scrum, the management and develop-
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Fig. 2. Boxplots for general agility comparison between normal Scrum and S-Scrum
(From “1” to “5” means less agile (“negative”) to very agile (“positive”))
ment team determine the sprint backlog with functional requirements in the
sprint planning meeting. All the team members have a clear overview of and
commitment to the sprint plan with relatively high-level features. The devel-
opers accomplish each item with their own detailed tasks. The requirements
from the management and the concrete realizations from the developer reach a
consensus during each sprint. In S-Scrum, the integrated STPA and the safety
requirements break the balance. The functional requirements are correlated with
the safety requirements. However, some developers preferred: functional require-
ments are more important than the safety requirements. It was found that the
need for long-term quality was given a lower priority than the need for short-
term progress [29]. Moreover, the safety expert spent a relatively short time
working with the team members which influences also the decision making. As
one developer mentioned: The safety expert is not working in the same room with
the development team and has an inconsistent working time. Thus, a lack of an
in-time decision maker on the safety requirements together with the ignorance
of safety requirements in the development team cause the conflict.
To face this challenge, a safety culture should be integrated into a light-weight
development process. We suggest to include an internal safety expert in the
development team to (1) spread the safety culture; (2) increase the safety ex-
pert’s working time with the team members; (3) clarify the bewilded safety
requirements. An external safety expert is necessary to keep the communica-
tion with other stakeholders. To fill the gap between the external safety expert
8 Yang Wang, Jasmin Ramadani, and Stefan Wagner
and the development team, the development team suggests that the external
safety expert should join at least once the weekly Scrum meeting. The discus-
sion between the management, the external safety expert and the internal safety
expert could strive a fresh balance on the priorities.
Challenge 2: The communication between team members and safety expert is
disturbed. To start with, the unclear safety-related documentation influences an
effective communication. The team members mentioned: it is difficult to com-
prehend the purpose of the safety expert and integrate into our daily work from
the existing documents. Moreover, a lack of safety-related knowledge of the de-
velopment team influences the discussion concerning safety issues. Finally, the
insufficient time spent between safety expert and development team causes also a
poor communication. Without a non-obstacle work place to communicate within
the team about the work progress, the safety assurance could either be a super-
ficial decoration or even worse, a roadblock during fast product delivery.
To face this challenge, in addition to the separated internal safety expert
and external safety expert, a weekly safety meeting is suggested by an
interviewee: The internal safety expert and external safety expert should meet
each other at least once a week to exchange the status of the development team.
Because the discussion should be deep in the safety area, it is not supposed to
be established during the normal weekly Scrum meeting. Last but not least, we
improve our safety epics and safety stories to support an effective communi-
cation [34], as shown in Sect. 4.3 (Optimized S-Scrum).
Challenge 3: The safety requirements are not determined early enough to ap-
propriately influence design and testing. In sprint 6 and sprint 7, the safety
requirements were determined by the development team and the safety expert
together in the sprint planning meeting. However, as one interviewee mentioned:
the determination of safety requirements from the safety product backlog is too
late to avoid a conflict between the functional requirements and their suitability
for the coming sprint. Thus, sometimes the functional design and testing have
to start without the in-time safety requirements.
To face this challenge, we propose a pre-planning meeting for solving the
time pressure problem. First, the internal, external safety experts and product
owner discuss the safety product backlog and the functional product backlog
in the pre-planning meeting. Then they brainstorm the results with the whole
development team in the sprint planning meeting to gather more ideas and make
each safety requirement clear.
Challenge 4: The planning at the start of each iteration is insufficient. In the
normal Scrum, the development team and the product owner plan the upcoming
sprint in the sprint planning meeting by formulating the sprint backlog with es-
timated items, which makes the development team sufficiently confident about
their plan. However, the estimation and planning for the safety product back-
log seem not ideal, as well as the interconnection with the functional product
backlog, which make an in-time identification of the sprint backlog difficult. An
interviewee said: It is difficult to determine the safety requirements when the
development team has not planned the functional requirements for the coming
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sprint.
To face this challenge, we suggest and adapt an agile safety plan [21] in con-
nection with the pre-planning meeting to increase the understanding of safety
issues and enhance confidence. In our project, the results of STPA are part of
the agile safety plan.
Challenge 5: The time to perform upfront planning is late. A team member said:
the pre-planning meeting for safety issues should start before the sprint planning
meeting. But the concrete time should be decided between the external safety ex-
pert, the internal safety expert and the product owner. Based on the experience
of the previous sprints, it is better to start upfront planning one week before the
sprint planning meeting (3 weeks/sprint). The time could be changed depending
on the sprint length. More explanations are in challenge 4.
Challenge 6: The safety requirements lack well-defined completion criteria. In the
normal Scrum, we have various testing methods to determine the completion of
each feature such as unit testing, system testing, regression testing, and accep-
tance testing, which are promoted to be automated in an agile context. However,
few agile testing methods are suitable for validating safety requirements, as the
safety requirements are either from standard requirements or the safety anal-
ysis, which differentiates safety testing and functional testing. In S-Scrum, we
use UAT (User Acceptance Testing) for validating safety requirements. Thus, a
suitable safety criterion becomes important.
To face this challenge, we use a “Given-When-Then” format [23] as safety re-
quirements’ criteria. The development team suggest that the external safety
expert could decide the safety stories’ criteria and the internal safety expert
could decide the safety tasks’ criteria. The whole development team could
brainstorm both criteria. To this end, the product owner and safety expert
perform the acceptance testing.
4.3 Case study - stage 2
After the optimizations described above, the objective of stage 2 is to validate
the safety and agility of the optimized S-Scrum and discuss it in industry. We
focus on answering the RQ 4 together with some discussion from industry. The
general research strategy in stage 2 is shown in Table 2.
Optimized S-Scrum To have a clear overview, we compare the optimized
S-Scrum to the normal Scrum and the S-Scrum in our project respectively in
Table 3. In the optimized S-Scrum, we differentiate between an internal safety
expert and an external safety expert. A pre-planning meeting and weekly safety
meetings are established between safety experts. We include the safety epics, to
satisfy <the overall safety needs>, the system must <always be able to reach
a safe state> [22], in the story map. The safety product backlog is improved
with optimized safety story: To keep <control action> safe, the system must
<achieve or avoid something>. An agile safety plan based on STPA technology
is suggested for a clear overview. The safety culture is expected to be enhanced
by the additional activities.
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Table 2. Research strategy in stage 2 (“DL”-Developer, “SH”-Stakeholder, “SM”-
Scrum Master, “PO”-Product Owner)
Time Sprint 10 to sprint 11 Sprint 12 Sprint 13
Process optimized S-Scrum optimized S-Scrum optimized S-Scrum
Data collection
Participant observation
Scrum artifacts
Documentation review
Questionnaires
Semi-structured
interviews
Participants
DLs
SHs
8 voluntary DLs
1 PO (from EPLAN)
1 SM (from EPLAN)
Data types Quantitative Quantitative Qualitative
Analysis
Sum of the numbers
(compare with the data
from stage 1)
Median and MAD
(compare with the data
from stage 1)
Coding
Output
Safety data:
M16.1-M16.3
M17.1-M17.3
Agility data:
M1-M15
Preliminary
discussion
in industry
Table 3. Normal Scrum, S-Scrum and optimized S-Scrum in Smart Home (“DL”-
Developer, “SM”-Scrum Master, “PO”-Product Owner, “SE”-Safety Expert)
Normal
Scrum
14 DLs
1 SM
1 PO
Sprint planning meeting
Weekly Scrum meeting (2 times/week)
Sprint review meeting
Sprint retrospective meeting
Story map
Product backlog
Sprint backlog
S-Scrum
14 DLs
1 SM
1 PO
1 SE
Sprint planning meeting
(with safety planning)
Weekly Scrum meeting (2 times/week)
(with safety discussion)
Sprint review meeting
(with safety review)
Sprint retrospective meeting
Story map
Functional product backlog
Safety product backlog
Sprint backlog
Optimized
S-Scrum
13 DLs
1 SM
1 PO
1 external SE
1 internal SE
Pre-planning meeting
Sprint planning meeting
(brainstorming requirements and criteria)
Weekly Scrum meeting (2 times/week)
Weekly safety meeting (1 time/week)
Sprint review meeting
(with safety review)
Sprint retrospective meeting
Story map
(with safety epics)
Functional product backlog
Safety product backlog
(with safety stories)
Sprint backlog
Safety plan
Data collection in stage 2 Stage 2 is from sprint 10 to sprint 13. The safety-
related data, M16.1 to M16.3 and M17.1 to M17.3, were collected in the same
way as in stage 1. The safety results were collected by both internal and external
safety experts. The agility-related data, M1 to M15, were collected by the second
round questionnaires6. We further discussed the optimized S-Scrum by conduct-
ing 2 semi-structured interviews with one Scrum Master and one Product Owner
from EPLAN GmbH, Germany. The interview lasted 2 hours. We formulated
questions about the status of the Scrum development process in the company
projects; the feasibility of the optimized S-Scrum in industry; and further sug-
gestions from the industrial perspective. A project background illustration was
provided before the interviews, together with the interview guidelines7. The field
notes, interview transcripts, and voice recordings were all preserved for backup.
6 The questionnaire is available: https://zenodo.org/record/439696#.WODCovl96Uk
7 The interview guideline is available: https://zenodo.org/record/439696#.WODCovl96Uk
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Data analysis in stage 2 The quantitative data were compared with the
numbers in stage 1. The interview results from the industry were text encoded
with: status, challenges, possible solutions, and the feasibility of S-Scrum.
Results in stage 2 - RQ 4: What are the effects of the optimized S-
Scrum on safety and agility? As shown in Fig. 3, most of the evaluated agility
aspects sustained a good level of satisfaction with little variance. However, the
“technical design” is slightly reduced. Due to the new role, the collaborative
part of design between safety work and development work fell on the internal
safety expert. The personal capability is becoming important. To improve the
technical design, cooperation shall increase between the external safety expert
and the development team.
Fig. 3. Boxplots for agility comparison between S-Scrum and optimized S-Scrum (From
“1” to “5” means less agile (“negative”) to very agile (“positive”))
Regarding the safety of optimized S-Scrum, as we can see in Fig. 4, safety
aspects improved (M16.1, M16.2, M16.3, M17.1, M17.2). We also rejected few
safety requirements (M17.3): 1 (sprint 6), 1 (sprint 7), 0 (sprint 10), 2 (sprint
11). We can conclude that, in general, the optimized S-Scrum has better safety
assurance capabilities. However, there are still some abnormal values in sprint 7.
The number of safety requirements, the number of safety requirements traceable
to hazards and the number of accepted safety requirements in sprint 7 are more
than in sprint 10. This may be traced back to the fitting-in phase of the optimized
S-Scrum. Since the training of STPA for the internal safety expert, we finished
STPA in sprint 10 only once. In sprint 6, sprint 7, and sprint 11, we finished
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STPA twice. After the adaption of the new role, the safety data rose in sprint
11.
Fig. 4. Safety data comparison between S-Scrum and optimized S-Scrum (“SRs” -
Safety Requirements)
Results in stage 2 - Discussion To strength the study further, we discussed
our results preliminarily in industry. For Challenge 1, the conflict between func-
tional requirements and non-functional requirements seems not obvious. As one
interviewee mentioned: Since we have a relative small amount of non-functional
requirements, the priorities are always determined by the product owner together
with the discussion with some external experts. For Challenge 2, one interviewee
mentioned: To enhance the communication between the team members and the
experts, we have a technical meeting before each sprint planning meeting. The
product owner sends the emails to the relevant experts depending on the goals of
each sprint. The experts are welcomed to join the daily stand-up meetings. Thus,
the experts have sufficient time to keep up with the development team, while the
technical knowledge is deeply discussed in the technical meeting before the sprint
planning meeting. The project has also a good knowledge sharing mechanism to
support the communication during each sprint. One interviewee mentioned: We
use pair programming, formal guidelines to teach new colleagues, chat clients,
and screen sharing. When the team includes experts, the product owner will con-
tact 2-3 colleagues to discuss technical stuff, who will inform other colleagues.
A hierarchical communication mode is preferred for a multi-expert team. For
Challenge 3, the industrial projects have also mentioned this problem: Internal
user stories are used to record the non-functional requirements. The execution of
internal user stories is up to the team. For Challenge 4, the two teams execute
a sufficient planning. An interviewee mentioned: We have a refinement time slot
to get all product backlog items approved (each team member has understood)
and not so much discussion in the sprint planning meeting. The team members
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are beginning the refinement in the present sprint for the user stories in the
next sprint. In Scrum, not all requirements have to be at the same level of de-
tail at the same time [24]. The progressive refinement could be further extended
for the safety planning and assessment to: (1) avoid a premature development
decision from the high-level safety requirements; (2) reserve sufficient time for
managing priorities between safety requirements and functional requirements;
(3) increase the rework possibilities; (4) enhance the likelihood of using conver-
sation to clarify safety requirements. That could also illustrate the Challenge 5.
For Challenge 6, the refinement phase helps building a pre-understanding of each
requirement and reaching a common criterion in the sprint planning meeting.
The external expert is a regular member in industry. An interviewee mentioned:
We prefer some experts with deep knowledge in the team, but the arrangement
of an internal expert has to take more issues into account, such as training,
responsibility, and even personal development. An external safety consultant to
test the products and delivered trainings and an internal safety initiative [20]
to promote safety practices across groups in industry could be align with our
internal and external safety expert. Safety culture in industry is enhanced either
by setting the regulations or by the established organization structure and ac-
tivities. An agile safety plan is also required from some standards. They draw
the safety plan either in the technical meeting or in parallel with the refinement.
The technical meeting suggested in industry could also be considered as an ex-
tra (weekly) safety meeting. The pre-planning meeting seems to be a suitable
form for realizing progressive refinement in industry. This alignment motivates
more combinations between our optimizations and existing industrial practices.
All the requirements and acceptance criteria are retrieved by brainstorming. An
effective communication plays a vital role in executing acceptance testing.
5 Threats to validity
Construct validity: The first threat to construct validity is the general data
analysis framework. To apply Scrum for safety-critical systems, we focus primar-
ily on safety aspect and agility aspect in our exploratory study. In terms of agility,
we referred to an official agility comparative survey [12] for ensuring the cover-
age of measurement. In terms of safety, S-Scrum was extended from Safe Scrum,
which was originally developed in accordance with the general functional safety
standard IEC 61508. Thus, the validation regarding to the consistency with IEC
61508 has not been included in the framework. Furthermore, in S-Scrum we
mainly integrate STPA. We aim to validate the enhanced safety concerning the
integrated safety analysis technique. Thus, the safety assurance technique’s ca-
pability and the deliverable products’ safety are set as two relevant goals. Yet,
the goals and metrics seem not enough and the validation framework is pos-
sible to be extended. The second threat to construct validity is the validation
periods for S-Scrum and optimized S-Scrum are shorter than our expectations.
We executed the normal Scrum in the first five sprints to strengthen students’
background knowledge of agile techniques and prepare the detailed organization
structure, which took us a lot of time.
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Internal validity: The first threat to internal validity is the arrangement of
team roles. One of the authors acted as the product owner and the safety expert
concurrently in sprint 6 and sprint 7. To avoid this threat in alignment with the
optimizations in sprint 10 and sprint 11, the product owner acted further as an
external safety expert. An internal safety expert has been arranged in the de-
velopment team. The second threat to internal validity exists in the qualitative
data from the semi-structured interviews. The interviews have been performed
by one of the authors together with the audio record. The language we used has
also partial German. To avoid subjective and language bias, the audio recording
has been transcribed independently by two researchers (one is a native German
speaker) and compared to formulate a final result.
External validity: A student project is different from an industrial project.
However, Ho¨st et al. [30], Tichy, Kitchenham et al. [31] proposed that students
could be acceptable. To consider this debatable issue, we mainly referred to an
empirical study conducted by Falessi in 2017 [36]. 16 statements are provided
by 65 empirical researchers. They mentioned: Conducting experiments with pro-
fessionals as a first step should not be encouraged unless high sample sizes are
guaranteed or performing replicas is cheap. In our research, there exists few in-
dustrial projects for developing safety-critical systems fully adopted a Scrum
development process according to the preliminary research [35]. S-Scrum was
also proposed in 2016 as a high-level process model. In addition, the long learn-
ing cycles and a new technology are two hesitations for using professionals. STPA
was developed in 2012. In industry, there is still a lack of experts. Thus, we be-
lieve that in our research area, a student project is a relative suitable way to
aggregate contributions. Even though, the generalizability is considered critical.
Reliability: The student project is a suitable way for a first validation. Yet, the
results from the students are limited by their personal experience. Besides, the
“grading power” of the researchers may influence the results. We separated our
research work from the final examination of the product to mitigate this threat.
6 Conclusion
The main benefit of our research is that it provides a first empirical and prac-
tical insight into applying Scrum for safety-critical systems with the integration
of STPA. Moreover, the presented challenges existing in priority management,
communication, time pressure on determining safety requirements, safety plan-
ning, safety requirements’ acceptance criteria and solutions including the split of
the safety expert, pre-planning meeting, regular safety meeting, improved safety
epics, STPA-based safety stories and an agile safety plan could arouse interest
in practitioners and show future research directions. The effects on safety and
agility aspects indicate the feasibility to align STPA with a Scrum development
process. The discussion in industry motivates the further step of transmitting the
optimized S-Scrum from the academic environment towards industry environ-
ment. However, the execution of S-Scrum and optimized S-Scrum was in a spe-
cific context. We can rely our improvements on an academical project only. The
generalization in industry of the optimizations remains subject to future work.
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Finally, regarding safety and security in agile development in today’s cyber-
physical systems, even though special attention has to be paid to the respective
norms and standards, problems’ exploration in practice seems also necessary.
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